Prague, 29 October 2026

Judging by the reactions of Czech politicians and experts with an economic background, I see that an obsession with having our own currency, alongside continuing scepticism about the merits of the common European currency, prevails in Czechia. “The Czech koruna, not the euro” appears in the election manifesto of ANO, the party now in government. ANO and the Motorists are now putting the crowning touch to this by planning to sanctify the Czech currency: “We pledge that our government will neither adopt the euro nor take any steps towards its introduction.” The government has also endorsed a proposal to enshrine the Czech koruna in the Constitution. It was submitted as a parliamentary bill by Foreign Minister and Motorists party leader Petr Macinka; Boris Šťastný, the Motorists’ Minister for Sport, Prevention and Health; MP and honorary Motorists president Filip Turek; and Tomio Okamura, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and leader of the SPD.
It should be added that the euro barely featured as an issue for any of the candidates standing for the Senate. Minister Macinka began his attack on the EU several months ago when he decided to close the European Centres, which help us both to implement our EU commitments more effectively and to make better use of European funds to support the regions, culture and business. Former Czech National Bank governor Jiří Rusnok now says that the euro is unpopular with Czech voters and that he therefore does not support it either.
For those of us who support adopting the euro, it is difficult to understand how this aversion to it can elevate the Czech koruna’s importance almost to the point of sanctity. Insisting on retaining the koruna did little to help the Czech state and economy in the past, as we know from the economic crisis of 1929 to 1934 and the period of central planning. If anything, the opposite was true. Today’s Czech monetary policy is not entirely independent, as its supporters claim, but is heavily dependent on the policies of the European Central Bank and probably the US Federal Reserve too. Any significant departure comes at a cost to the economy, as demonstrated, for example, by the exchange rate commitment from November 2013 to April 2017: reduced purchasing power, inflationary pressure, a flood of speculative capital and little encouragement for innovation. One need only compare movements in Czech interest rates with those in the euro area.
Nor does the Czech koruna free the Czech economy from a risk premium in investment markets. Even our Prime Minister, who rejects the euro, can confirm this: his businesses make extensive use of cheaper euro loans instead of borrowing equivalent amounts in Czech koruna at higher interest rates. These are just some of the problems associated with an independent currency. Higher transaction costs in dealings between Czechia and euro area members inevitably translate into higher costs for businesses and households. Exchange rate risk and higher bank charges put Czech businesses that cannot conduct transactions in euros at a disadvantage.
An independent Czech monetary policy does not guarantee better results than membership of the euro area would deliver. Inflation figures for Czechia and the euro area bear this out. Cumulative price growth between 2017 and 2025 was 54.5% in Czechia, compared with just 28.5% in the euro area. If France is criticised for increasing financial instability within the euro area, Czechia is doing the same internally through its independent monetary policy. As we know, having an independent currency is associated with a greater likelihood of a currency crisis, as we have experienced twice in the past 20 years. The Czech National Bank may argue that these crises originated elsewhere, but it must then convince investors that Czechia is a unique exception, immune to currency crises. I am referring here not to direct investors, but to bond markets. They still invest in Czechia only in return for a risk premium.
Czech economists who criticise the euro argue that adopting it is irrational because the euro area is not an “optimum currency area”. I agree, but would add that it comes very close. That is the basis of our disagreement. I agree that capital markets in the EU are not fully integrated. Nor is the EU labour market as flexible as that of the United States. The American federation of 50 states sharing a common currency, as I knew it when I worked there, has functioned effectively and credibly for a very long time. But I do not view the EU through the eyes of a theoretical economist who advises against the euro on the basis of “comparative statics”, as even Krugman and Stiglitz do. I look at it from the perspective of practical economic policymaking. If I draw on any theory, it is the “theory of the second best”. I cannot help seeing the European project primarily as a source of peace and political stability, which Europe had lacked for so long, and secondly as a means of creating the conditions for economic growth.
What is the alternative? Integration based solely on free trade, as advocated by former President Klaus, will not deliver that political stability because it does not give us the tools to resolve disputes between us. Protectionism would deliver neither economic growth nor peace, as we learnt in the 1930s and as the collapse of central planning also demonstrated.
This way of thinking fails to take account of the present geopolitical and geoeconomic situation. Europe must integrate more closely if it wants to compete with China and the United States. The first warning signs were President Trump’s tariffs on EU exports to the United States and further threats of US retaliation against EU efforts to tax the internet services provided by American companies in the European market. Do our foreign affairs and economic ministries really believe that their negotiating position with the Americans would be stronger than that of the EU?
A second warning sign is the dramatic expansion of Chinese exports, both globally and into European markets. The principal problem with these exports is the enormous subsidies given to Chinese manufacturers and the resulting serious disruption of bilateral economic relations across global markets. Do the Czech finance, economic and foreign affairs ministries really believe they can negotiate reductions in Chinese subsidies and a change in China’s macroeconomic policy to reduce global financial imbalances?
I hardly need mention resource rich Russia, which still owes us money dating back to the communist era and essentially refuses even to discuss it with us. Without a strong EU, individual European states would be entirely subordinate to the interests of the United States, China and Russia in the global economy. With international agreements already weakened by Trump’s policies, Chinese expansion that disregards fundamental WTO rules, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, we face a dramatically changed geopolitical landscape.
Minister Macinka is probably not an economist, and evidently does not surround himself with experienced economists either. But his initiative with Turek also exposes his shortcomings as a diplomat, a politician and someone who is supposed to represent the Czech Republic effectively. As a diplomat, he should know that his initiative has little chance of surviving a legal and constitutional challenge. As a politician, particularly one representing a minority party in government, he is placing the Prime Minister in a highly precarious position from which the Prime Minister cannot emerge a winner. And as a representative of the Czech Republic, Mr Macinka is portraying our country as deeply divided and as a state that calls its EU commitments into question. While his initiative may satisfy his ego, in his capacity as Foreign Minister he is damaging the interests of the state.
Zdeněk Drábek